



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

RECENT BRITISH PERIODICAL LITERATURE IN
ETHICS.

As representative of recent periodical literature of ethical interest, two articles, or rather two series of articles, may be selected for exceptional importance. Philosophical speculation (in the pages of *Mind*) has taken the form chiefly of historical studies; practical investigation (in the pages of the *Hibbert Journal*, the *Eugenics Review*, and the *Shield*) has centred around problems of depopulation and birth-control. Mr. P. S. Burrell's "Plot of Plato's Republic" (*Mind*, Nos. 97-99), and Professor McBride's "Study of Heredity" (*Eugenics Review*, Vol. VIII, Nos. 1-4) are the most valuable contributions to their respective fields.

Mr. Burrell takes the view which is maintained by so eminent a Hellenist as Paul Shorey in his *Unity of Plato's Thought* and which is now pretty generally accepted: the view that Plato's philosophy, and the *Republic* in particular, forms a consistent whole. In the course of his article he refutes certain distinguished critics (notably Jowett, Gomperz, and Mr. A. D. Lindsay) who discriminate the "Socratic" from the "post-Socratic" books, or who find various inexplicable transitions in the work. Mr. Burrell demolishes the Box and Cox bogey of the "historical" and the "Platonic" Socrates. Taking up each section of the *Republic* in order, he shows how it contributes to the whole work. To refute Thrasymachus it is necessary to discuss the nature of reality, to raise the question whether there is a moral world. And in order to study the morality of the individual we must first study the "larger letters" of society. Among noteworthy theories opposed are: 1. Gomperz' complete misunderstanding in his statement that the connection of moral, political and historical philosophy was slight. For Plato the connection was vital. Furthermore, the "first city" is no more a description of real society than the second or third city: Socrates' state is ideal from end to end. 2. The three virtues in the state do not as Jowett supposed correspond to the three parts of the soul. Nor is there any confusion between justice and temperance. Temperance consists in harmony between the rulers and the ruled, justice in the doing by each of his own work. 3. Justice does not as Pater

thought "supervene" upon the other virtues; it is what makes them possible.

In the April number of *Mind*, an article by E. W. Hirst, "Moral Sense, Moral Reason, and Moral Sentiment," has for its foundation a criticism of Dr. Rashdall's theories, especially as set forth in his last book (*Is Conscience an Emotion?*). Dr. Rashdall fails to do justice to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Their Moral Sense is not simply a "particular sort of feeling or emotion" but involves reflection on action. Dr. Rashdall thinks that in reducing the Moral Sense to a kind of Moral Taste these writers abandon all objective criteria. But in matters of art, and even in matters of food, there is always *some* objective criterion, and furthermore the moralists in question do recognise the objectivity of the Moral Sense. (When Mr. Hirst says that "the obligation to cultivate correct views on art essentially differs from the duty of manifesting right conduct" he perhaps means or should mean "different from the duty of cultivating correct views on conduct," which is not quite what he says.) Mr. Hirst objects that Shaftesbury and Hutcheson do not sufficiently recognise the difference between the moral and the æsthetic sense: æsthetic judgment depends on a certain "involuntary factor." (So, however, does the understanding of right and wrong, as distinguished from mere correct behaviour.)

Dr. Rashdall maintains that only as moral judgments are the work of Reason can their objectivity and authority be assured. Reason gives us the axioms of Equity and Rational Benevolence—but these, says Mr. Hirst, depend for application upon a quantitative estimate. Though Dr. Rashdall says that goods are commensurable "only for the purposes of choice," this restriction does not seem to prevent a sufficient amount of one good from being equivalent to another amount of another good. Choice would then depend upon "taste." Dr. Rashdall, however, in his recent work, erects a hierarchy of goods. Mr. Hirst denies that ethical quality attaches to the form of activity (*e.g.* he denies that intellectual activity is more 'moral' than eating) but not to the motive. The so-called higher activities are higher only because they are less immediately selfish. Dr. Rashdall holds feelings to be an object rather than an essential constituent of the value judgment. We judge *about* feeling. Mr. Hirst suspects that Canon Rashdall does not discriminate between the value-judgment and the judgment of fact. Mr. Hirst's own view of

Conscience is based upon the development of society. Conscience is a regard for the Tribe. It is extended not by the admission that "one man's good is of equal value with the like good of another" but by a wider notion of "unity."

Recent numbers of the *Hibbert* show the absorbing interest of educational reform and international ethics. Mr. Harold Begbie animadverts rather vaguely upon the direction which educational reconstruction in England ought to take. Mr. Chapman deprecates extreme pacifism and outlines the platform of the American League to Enforce Peace. Mr. J. A. Hobson replies to a review of Armstrong's *Our Ultimate Aim in the War* by Dr. Jacks. Dr. Jacks questioned two assumptions: (1) that a common will of mankind really exists, (2) that such a common will would be in favour of perpetual peace. Both of these assumptions Mr. Hobson undertakes to make plausible (deleting the word "perpetual"). He asserts that the "great majority of the more developed minds desire, will and plan many of the same objects and in conscious co-operation": in commerce, science, philosophy, religion, art, hygiene, education, social reform and society. He believes also that a will for peace at almost any price will be strengthened by the present war. Dr. Jacks criticised the League to Enforce Peace because it seems to assume that only one state at a time would rebel from its decisions. He, in turn, according to Mr. Hobson, assumes that there would exist strong fixed parties in the Parliament of Nations, and that their sympathies would be strong enough to detach a powerful minority from the decisions of the Parliament. Mr. Hobson does not claim for the Federation (at least as an immediate ideal) the right of interference in the affairs of the several states; the Federation would not, for example, be empowered to accord independence to India. He further suggests that the Federation need not, in its inception, include more than the seven great powers, and remarks justly that their conduct toward lesser nations in the capacity of a corporate body, would probably be juster than the separate Imperialisms of each. Mr. Hobson hardly meets Dr. Jacks's objection that we shall not find working toward Internationalism the same federative forces which have produced the several states, but he has a strong argument in the contention that whatever the defects of international government, no better means of avoiding the ruin of civilization has yet been devised.

In the April number Dr. Jacks makes a number of shrewd

observations on the future after the war, though with a tantalizing vagueness in conclusion. He remarks that all the schemes for reconstruction put forward depend for their execution upon the war's ending favourably for England, and goes on to point out that a Europe divided into victors and vanquished would not be a very promising ground for the new crop of reforms—no matter which side was the victor. On the other hand, Dr. Jacks is strongly opposed to "peace without victory." His solution is to dispense punishment to the "small group of exceptionally dangerous men" to whom the war and wars are due. He does not enter upon details as to the torture to be applied to these culprits, and he mentions no names; and he does not state whether any of the persons are to be found outside of Germany.

Mr. A. D. Maclarén, late a prisoner of war at Ruhleben, analyses the feelings of national hate in various countries. Mr. Barbour and Miss Maynard both discuss the place of Force in Christian ethics, and arrive at somewhat similar conclusions. Miss Maynard cuts the knot as follows:

"John xviii, 36: 'If my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight.' Is Britain a kingdom of this world? Most decidedly she is. She is a kingdom that above all others stands for the three great foundation-stones of the State—Justice, Liberty, and Benevolence."

Professor McBride's article in the *Eugenics Review*, referred to above, occupies a large part of four issues. It is in large part highly technical, although well written, and made as intelligible as possible to the uninitiated. We can here only quote Professor McBride's main conclusions, without attempting to outline the experiments upon which they are based:

In all cases where large numbers of a given species of animals are raised under somewhat artificial conditions a certain number of monsters will be produced, apparently owing to a disturbance of the germ-cells in their growing and ripening. This is true both of insects raised on banana peel and of human beings raised in a large city. These monsters in most, but not in all cases, differ from the normal type, in the loss of some feature which the normal type possesses, and hence are to be looked on as defectives. . . .

Exercise of the functions tends to enlarge the organs by which these functions are carried out, and this exercise continued through generations slowly modifies the structure of the stock, till eventually the resulting change can show itself in the young before the exercise has been begun. Conversely persistent disuse of function tends slowly to atrophy the organs by which they are carried on, till eventually these organs are only developed in a reduced form.

Professor McBride draws two conclusions of social importance: 1. That in former times the struggle for existence was enough to keep down the defective element in the population; but under present conditions these people are protected and multiply. He advocates therefore segregation and sterilization for the benefit of society. 2. The transmissibility of acquired characters makes the problem of education of the highest importance: we must adopt such a system of education that "the next generation may start at a very slightly higher level of capacity than their fathers."

In replying to a writer in the *New Statesman* who had written in praise of this article, Professor McBride points out (*New Statesman*, March 17, 1917) that the inheritance of acquired characters is not taken as proved, but only as rendered highly probable. And in reference to the two conclusions mentioned above, he says that while racial improvement by any means must be a very slow process, the harm done by the propagation of the defective is very quickly felt. Furthermore, he insists upon the importance of the responsibility of parents: "there is no system of state subventions," he says very justly, "which will not break down if parental responsibility be removed and reckless reproduction encouraged."

In the January number (1917) Major Darwin, whose articles always deserve attention, discusses methods for encouraging reproduction on the part of the best classes in the community, and for discouraging reproduction on the part of the incompetent, thriftless and pauper element. Mr. A. K. Chalmers also has an able article on the report of the National Birth-Rate Commission.

In the April number Havelock Ellis ("Birth-Control and Eugenics") argues that birth-control is a continuation of the same process as the gradual diminution in number of offspring in the higher animals. There are various points of view from which birth-control may be advocated: the evolutionary, the economic, the humanitarian and the medical (as in cases when a woman lacks the physical strength for child-birth). The eugenic standpoint is still another. Birth-control is an essential part of eugenic propaganda. We must (1) increase and promote the knowledge of the laws of heredity, (2) popularise a knowledge of the methods of birth-control, (3) act in accordance with our knowledge. Our action must be inspired by a high sense of personal responsibility. Mr. Ellis deprecates hasty eugenic legislation and legal regulation of marriage.

The birth-rate problem also receives attention in the *Shield* (a "Review of Moral and Social Hygiene"), which has done a useful service in reprinting the report of the Birth-rate Commission in England in its October issue. Its activities intersect with those of the *Eugenics Review*, but it is occupied with the social aspect of eugenics exclusively. Eugenics is in fact only one of its interests, and it devotes much of its space to the subject of prostitution. In printing statistics, notes, reports, and in its reviews this quarterly performs excellent work; and its editorials are usually written in a sensible and moderate tone. For the opinions expressed in the articles the editors disclaim responsibility; and as might be expected, the articles are of various merit and from various points of view. One confusion which exists in the campaign for public health is the differences of standpoint with which different reformers attack the same problems. There is the religious, the sentimental, the hygienic-practical; with all possible hybrids of religious-sentimental, hygienic-sentimental, et cetera. One reformer will look forward to more freedom between the sexes, another to less. The weakness of many of the articles is that they "get you nowhere."

The March number contains a full discussion, with citation of the pertinent documents, of Sir George Cave's Criminal Law Amendment Bill (1917). The Association for Moral and Social Hygiene objects to clauses 2 and 6 of this bill. We reprint sections 2 and 3 of clause 2, and section 6 of clause 6.

2. If a person acts in contravention of this section (section 1, forbidding persons suffering from venereal disease to have intercourse or to solicit to intercourse) that person shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding two years, or on summary conviction to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding six months.

Provided that a person shall not be convicted under this section if that person proves that he or she had reasonable grounds to believe that he or she was free from venereal disease at the time the alleged offence was committed.

3. Where any person is convicted of any of the offences mentioned in the schedule to this Act, the court may, if they think fit, for the purpose of ascertaining whether that person is suffering from venereal disease in a communicable form order that person to submit to such medical examination and tests as may be requisite for that purpose.

If the person is a female, the examination and tests shall be conducted, if she so desires, by a female doctor.

CLAUSE 6.

6. The power to impose a penalty on a person convicted of an offence under No. 11 of section fifty-four of the Metropolitan Police Act, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 57 (which relates to loitering for the purpose of prostitution or solicitation), or convicted under section twenty-eight of the Towns Police Clauses Act 1847, 10 & 11 Vict. c. 89, as a common prostitute or night-walker for loitering and importuning passengers for the purpose of prostitution or convicted of any similar offence under any Act, by-law, or regulation is hereby (where necessary) extended so as to include power, on the conviction of a person after a previous conviction for any such offence, to impose imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding one month.

The Association remarks: "The particular injustice of sub-sections 3 and 4 (dealing with presumption for disease) lies in the fact that this heavy sentence and forced medical examination can be imposed upon women without any evidence, other than police evidence, being given at any stage, that any person was infected, solicited, or molested by the women accused."

Miss Macmillan points out that "prostitutes" (in the legal definition of the term) are not accorded a full and equal protection of the law with other "women." The Editor (Miss Nielson) rightly deprecates the agitation for the protection of soldiers from "harpies," and points out that much of the "protection" is merely weakening the soldier's sense of personal responsibility and self-control, besides unfairly penalizing the women in cases where the initiative may have been on the part of the man. The article is followed by official correspondence and memoranda on the subject. The "Campaign for Compulsory Notification" is discussed, and the conclusion arrived at that compulsion is highly undesirable. It is a doubtful point whether the following suggestion of the Local Government Board manifests the highest moral tone:

The moral inducements to chastity should be supported by the fear which every right-minded lad and man and every woman ought to entertain of the terrible consequences of these diseases.

Prudence and morals are both good things, and can be brought to support each other, but they should not be confused. The Bhikku Silacara writes interestingly of sexual morality among the Burmese (except when contaminated by contact with other races, as in Rangoon). As reasons for the absence of prostitution and irregularity he adduces the lack of a pastoral clergy (marriages are civil and can easily be dissolved on reasonable grounds, even on the ground of incompatibility), the example of the Bhikkus, or monks

(who apparently practice without preaching), and the simplicity and low cost of living, which render early marriages possible. If the Bhikku Silacara's information is quite unbiased, the primitive Shan tribes are undoubtedly more civilized than ourselves.

T. STEARNS ELIOT.

LONDON, ENGLAND.

BOOK REVIEWS.

'I APPEAL UNTO CAESAR.' The Case of the Conscientious Objector. By Mrs. Henry Hobhouse. With Introduction by Professor Gilbert Murray, and Notes by the Earl of Selborne, Lord Parmoor, Lord Hugh Cecil, M.P., and Lord Henry Bentinck, M.P. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1917. Pp. xxii, 84. Price, 1s. net.

Existing conditions in respect of the treatment of conscientious objectors are hardly known in their details in England, and probably not at all in America, except to those who happen to be personally interested in the unhappy individuals concerned. The most influential part of the English press has succeeded by the simple process of saying nothing about it, in drawing a veil of obscurity over a most unsatisfactory business, and the purpose of this little book is to drag the facts to the light of day. Mrs. Hobhouse, the author, is in a position to deal with the subject, which is probably unique. She has three sons in the combatant services and a fourth undergoing a second term of imprisonment as a conscientious objector, and no one can fail to perceive that she feels that the cause all of them have at heart is in the end the same.

It must not be imagined that the book is a plea for pacifism; it is not even a defence of the position of the conscientious objector; but only a statement of facts and an appeal to England to consider whether the line of treatment adopted is producing anything whatever except suffering and resentment and disaffection. Pretty full accounts are given of the personal histories of some of the leading conscientious objectors, with a view to showing what manner of men they are, and extracts are quoted from their letters and reports as to prison experiences. It is impossible to summarise such an account, but two things specially emerge.